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Cooperative and savings banks in Europe: Nature, challenges and perspectives
Stakeholder-based financial institutions (cooperative and savings banks) have a long tradition 
in the financial system of developed countries. The prevalent form of these entities differs across 
countries as a result of the differentiated legislative reforms between the 1980s and the 1990s, 
but they still represent an important share in the banking sector in several countries. The trans-
formation and innovation of the financial system have increased the competitive environment 
that these entities face posing important challenges for the future. Moreover, the financial crisis 
initiated in 2007 has increased the challenges that stakeholder-based banks face and has 
highlighted the need for regulatory reform with a particular focus on corporate governance and 
funding diversification issues. The current debate about these reforms is not new; some Euro-
pean countries have already applied some regulatory reforms presenting different approaches.
Stakeholder-based financial institutions (cooperative and savings banks) have a long tradition 
in the financial system of developed countries. Originally, these entities were created to provide 
financial services to specific sectors or to improve the financial access in selected geographi-
cal areas. Their foundation used to be promoted by local authorities, religious organizations or 
professional associations. Later on, the transformation and innovation of the financial system 
increased the competitive environment that these entities face. These changes motivated a 
series of reforms in some European countries during the last two decades of the past century, 
with some countries opting for its privatization or demutualization. On the contrary, other coun-
tries opted for maintaining their traditional organization. More recently, the financial crisis has 
posed new challenges for these institutions. On one hand, it has highlighted the importance of 
liquidity and funding risk for banking activity. Thus stakeholder-based banks are faced with the 
problem of how to improve their access to wholesale funding. On the other hand, the crisis 
revealed some deficiencies related to their corporate governance, which were somehow re-
flected by the fact that these institutions received an important share of the public support. In 
this context, it is not surprising that some countries are debating on a new wave of restructur-
ing, even in those countries were this sector was already reformed some years ago (i.e. Nor-
way or United Kingdom).1
Even though the prevalent form of stakeholder-based banks differs across countries as a result 
of the differentiated legislative reforms between the 1980s and the 1990s, they still represent 
an important share in the banking sector in several countries (see Table 1). In countries like 
Germany, Spain, France or Norway, these entities entail more than 40 % of the financial sector 
assets. In the United Kingdom, a country that has experienced several waves of privatization, 
building societies maintain an important presence in the financial intermediation (20 % of retail 
deposits and 15 % of mortgage loans). However, their importance in terms of total assets is 
relatively small given the size of investment banking activities in this country.
This paper presents and discusses the main characteristics of stakeholder-based banks, the 
challenges they face nowadays and the reform experiences in some European countries. The 
paper is organized in six sections additional to this introduction. Next section reviews the main 
characteristics and classification of stakeholder-based banks, together with an overview of the 
stakeholder sector in some European countries. Section 3 describes the pros and cons of 
these entities. Section 4 presents some statistics regarding the performance and the public 
1 Introduction
1.  In the same vein, the public support received by systemic financial institutions has motivated numerous initiatives 
aimed to reduce these advantages.
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support received by these institutions during the financial crisis. Section 5 describes the main 
challenges for the future and goes through the reform experience of some European countries. 
Stakeholder-based banks are financial institutions where the ownership is not based on share-
holders (as it is the case of commercial banks) but in a social group or organization whose 
members share a common interest related with the provision of funding or the promotion of 
saving. These entities, which include a broad range of organizations, have a long tradition and 
most of them date from the 19th century. 
The existence of stakeholder-based banks has been debated for many years. Originally, these 
entities were created to foster the access to some banking services of those financially ex-
cluded groups of population. At that time, commercial banks did not provide these services 
because of several reasons related with national regulations, households risk characteristics 
and the underdevelopment of financial markets. Regulation limits were aimed to channel bank-
ing resources towards the funding of public debt (investment coefficient in public debt) or the 
investment in strategic sectors. These limits left a small scope for the banks to devote their 
funds to other sectors, including households and small and medium enterprises. Funding to 
these sectors was relatively riskier at this time since households and entrepreneur’s income 
volatility was elevated in a context where the welfare state and labour regulation had not been 
fully developed. Moreover, the management of credit risk coming from these sectors was dif-
ficult as a result of the lack of proper information [for example, Jappelli and Pagano (1993, 
2001)] show the importance of central credit registers to reduce adverse selection problems 
and to increase the volume of credit) and the difficulties to hedge these risks with the financial 
instruments available at this time.
Thereafter commercial banks started to expand their activities to these financially excluded 
areas as a result of the development of the financial sector. This trend was the result of a pro-
cess of financial innovation, liberalisation and an intense deregulation of the banking activity. 
Therefore, financial exclusion was pushed to the background as the main and general argu-
ment to justify the existence of these entities (although it could still be valid for some specific 
sectors or regions that are relatively small to be profitable enough for commercial banks).2 
Moreover, the rapid growth of the stakeholder-based sector during the last decades could be 
better explained by the expansion of the range of services and activities that these entities 
2 Stakeholder-based 
banks: Main 
characteristics and 
national peculiarities
2.1 GENERAL 
CHARACTERISTICS OF 
STAKEHOLDER-BASED BANKS
TYPE OF INSTITUTION
FRANCE GERMANY SPAIN NORWAY (a) UNITED KINGDOM
COOPERATIVE BANKS
%
SAVINGS BANKS & 
LANDESBANKEN
%
SAVINGS BANKS
%
SAVINGS BANKS
%
BUILDING SOCIETIES
%
Assets 38.3 34.6 52.2 63.0 4.6
Deposits 55.7 42.9 40.5 70.0 20 (b)
Loans 52.7 38.9 41.9 — 15 (b)
TABLE 1MARKET SHARES OF THE MAIN GROUP OF STAKEHOLDER-BASED BANKS BY COUNTRY
SOURCES: Ayadi et al. (2008), DSGV, Bank of Spain, Sparebankforeningen, Office for National Statistics, and H. M. Treasury (2009).
a. Including DnB Nor.
b. The share of deposits refers only to savings balances. The share of loans refers only to residential mortgages. Data correspond to years 
2008-2009.
2. In Spain, in 14 percent of the municipalities savings banks are the only provider of financial services, and represent 
70 % of the total number of branches municipalities with a population of less than 1,000 [WSBI and ESBG (2011)].
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 29 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 20
could offer (partially as consequence of the deregulation process),3 than on the grounds of fi-
nancial inclusion.
Nowadays, the main difference between stakeholder-based and commercial banks relies on 
the objectives pursued by the managers. Commercial bank managers care about maximizing 
the value of the ownership participation for shareholders by optimizing the future path of divi-
dends, buybacks and increases in the value of the share. Stakeholder-based banks managers’ 
concerns are not as concentrated in the value of ownership participation as they are also in-
terested in fulfil the different targets included in their mandate. As explained above, these ob-
jectives are related with providing banking services to some region or financially excluded indi-
viduals (savings banks) or to some group with some specific characteristics (cooperative 
banks). Moreover, ownership participation cannot be easily transferred and stakeholders do 
not receive an explicit dividend. The only direct benefits are materialized on social investments 
in the case of saving banks or through the improvement on the banking conditions (deposit or 
loans) in the case of cooperative banks. Obviously, this does not imply that stakeholder-based 
banks do not care about profit generation insofar it is related with the solvency of the firm and 
the possibility to fulfil the organization’s mandate over the long term. This mixture of character-
istics creates what is known as a “double-bottom” line for these institutions as they combine 
social and financial objectives. 
An additional important difference from commercial banks is that they cannot issue equity in 
the markets so they have to rely mostly on retained profits to increase their capital levels and 
they obtained a lower discipline from financial markets. Their legal nature supposes that merg-
ers and acquisitions usually are limited to voluntary operations that avoid the disciplinary effect 
of hostile bids.4 Moreover, these mergers use to be concentrated within similar entities that 
difficult the possibility to obtain economies of scale or scope that could result from mergers 
with other kind of financial institutions. For example, in the case of Spain Carbó et al. (2002) 
find that, during the wave of mergers within the savings bank sector between 1989 and 1993, 
on average, the new entities did not obtained substantial gains on efficiency. 
The classification of these banks comprises a high diversity of categories depending on the 
nature of the founders (public or private), the legal organization (foundation, private liability 
society or public entity), the kind of activities (specialized or universal banking) or the area of 
influence (local, regional or national). For simplicity and clarity of the arguments, this paper 
focuses on the distinction between cooperative and savings banks that are the most prevalent 
forms of organization.5 The main differences between savings and cooperative banks are:
– The nature: Cooperatives are private banks while savings banks have a closer af-
finity with public institutions (i.e. savings banks are in many cases, but not always, 
in public ownership). Therefore the public sector’s role in the corporate governance 
of saving banks – though admittedly varying among particular institutions – is not 
negligible. In fact, in some countries, like Germany, savings banks are governed by 
public laws (Trägerschaft).
– The corporate governance: Members of a cooperative bank are private citizens or 
individual entrepreneurs that play an active role in supervising the management of 
3. For example, in Spain, after the Fuentes Quintana Reform of 1977, competition became more intense as a result of 
the convergence between the savings banks regulatory framework to the one for commercial banks. Later on, savings 
banks started to expand geographically as a result of the liberalization of establishment in 1989, followed by a consolida-
tion process during the 1990s. 4. See Oliver Wyman (2008). 5. See Carbó and Méndez (2006) for a detailed classifica-
tion of these entities depending on their ownership structure. 
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the company. Their influence is not based on the size of their stakes but on the 
principle of “one member, one vote”. On the contrary, savings banks’ ownership is 
formed by depositors, employees, investors and local and regional public authori-
ties or non profit foundations. 
– Restrictions on Assets: Cooperative banks’ activities usually have some limits on 
asset allocation, such as the establishment of a minimum percentage of the assets 
to be devoted to a specific activity. Restrictions on saving banks are less usual and, 
when they exist, tend to be related with the geographical area in which they oper-
ate (territoriality principle).
This section includes a brief description of the stakeholder-based banks in some of the Euro-
pean countries where they still have an important presence: France, Germany, Spain, Norway 
and United Kingdom. Table 2 summarizes the most notable features of these entities prior to 
the regulatory reforms adopted as a result of the financial crisis started in 2007. This descrip-
tion tries to facilitate the reader the understanding of the playing field during the years prior to 
the financial meltdown. The different regulatory reforms applied between the 1980s and 1990s 
by these countries have resulted in a quite different mapping in each of the national banking 
systems. As it has been highlighted, there are some countries where cooperative banks are 
the prevalent legal form in this sector, i.e. France and United Kingdom, while in others, like 
Germany, Spain and Norway,6 savings banks have taken the major role. Moreover, these enti-
ties also present some other peculiarities between countries different from their legal status.
Regarding to those countries in which savings banks have a prominent role, there are models 
where their activity is restricted, i.e. Germany, while in others they are allowed to offer any kind 
of financial services, i.e. Spain and Norway. The case of Germany has some idiosyncratic 
characteristics since two different types of institutions can be differentiated within the Savings 
Bank Group: Sparkassen, at the local level, and Landesbanken, at the regional level. There 
exists also a national central institution, DGZ Dekabank Deutsche Girozentrale (DGZ Deka-
bank), which acts as a national Landesbank and is owned by the Landesbanken (50 %) and by 
the national association of savings banks (Deutscher Sparkassen und Giroverband, DSGV). 
The organizational and legal structures of both savings banks and Landesbanken have largely 
remained unchanged and, in fact, their existence is protected through the prohibition of merg-
ers or takeovers with institutions outside the Savings Bank Group. Savings banks constitute 
public law institutions with no private owner that are subject to some restrictions in their activ-
ity. For example, they cannot hold equity participations in entities outside the Savings Bank 
Group, undertake risky operations or operate outside their local area. Moreover, they should 
serve the public interest of their region, fostering savings and providing credit to the small and 
medium enterprise sector, and conduct their business according to sound business principles 
by law. Their capital is raised through retained earnings; indeed, profits are particularly impor-
tant for them since municipalities, as their owners, are rarely in a position to inject additional 
equity and since they cannot raise equity by issuing shares in the market [Ayadi et al. (2010)]. 
They can issue a form of preference shares, known as silent capital, which receive dividend 
payments and absorb losses, although the investors in these instruments can recover this 
amount when benefits turn positive. Besides the existence of savings banks, regional banks or 
Landesbanken represent a different kind of mutual financial entities which enjoy freedom of 
operation. These banks present different legal forms: Some are joint stock companies, while 
others are still public law institutions. Their ownership lies in hands of local savings banks, their 
2.2 NATIONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS IN SELECTED 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
6. The analysis will focus on the predominant stakeholder bank in each country, for example, in Spain only savings banks 
characteristics are presented although cooperative banks also exist in this country.
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respective regional public bodies and, in some cases, in some other Landesbanken. In par-
ticular, Landesbanken are the second tier of the Savings Bank Group and have two prominent 
functions: they serve as house banks of their respective state and act as the clearing houses 
or central banks for the local savings banks in their region. 
In the case of Norway, Sparebanks or savings banks have been traditionally organized as in-
dependent private foundations that enjoy freedom of operation. In 2002, these institutions 
were given the option of converting to limited liability savings banks. The new institutions are 
regulated essentially by the same provisions as commercial banks and, in order to be consid-
ered as savings banks, almost 10 % of the capital should be owned by a foundation. Equity is 
composed by accumulated reserves through retained earnings and since 1987 they have the 
option to raise capital in the market through the issuance of primary capital certificates or 
PCCs (known as equity certificates since 2009). In fact, this instrument is one of the main 
sources of tier 1 capital of Norwegian savings banks. PPCs are marketable securities similar 
to shares, with the difference that they do not give ownership rights over entity’s assets. In-
stead, PPCs holders elect ¼ of the committee of representatives, independently of their share 
within total capital. Profits are distributed between reserves; the gift fund, created to serve 
social and cultural purposes; and cash reserves, which are distributed among PPCs holders. 
The gift fund is created in order to fulfil some of the commitments that savings banks have with 
the communities where they operate, although there are not specific legal provisions to pursue 
specific social or welfare gains. In some sense, Norwegian savings banks have evolved through 
a mixed model allowing the access to capital for shareholders with some representation in the 
management while maintaining their double bottom line. 
Finally, prior to the recent restructuring, Spanish savings banks were organized as foundations 
of private nature combining financial activity with social vocation [Pérez Fernández et al. 
(2007)]. They had strong local roots; in fact, they were prohibited to expand their activities 
outside their municipality of origin (principle of territoriality). Since 1989 they enjoyed freedom 
of operation. Most of their capital came from accumulated reserves; at least 50 % of total 
profits should be devoted to raise capital. These institutions are regulated and supervised by 
the Bank of Spain, while Regional Governments set other legal considerations relative to their 
governance structure. For example, inter-regional mergers were subject to the authorization of 
the Autonomous Communities concerned. Regarding to their governance bodies, the General 
Assembly was formed by different stakeholders, including employees, representatives of de-
positor, local and regional government bodies (up to a limit of 50 % of total voting rights), 
founding entities and community interest groups. Savings banks could issue capital in form of 
equity units (cuotas participativas) which could not exceed 50 % of total equity and no one 
could hold more that 5 % of all equity units in circulation. Since their approval only one savings 
bank (Caja de Ahorros del Mediterráneo) has issued capital through this instrument. However 
these instruments do not incorporate voting rights and thus they do not enhance market dis-
cipline on the management of the entity, making these equity units relatively unattractive for 
investors [Centro PwC/IE del Sector Financiero (2010)]. They can also issue preference shares 
with non-voting rights. Profits were thus distributed between reserves, community toward 
projects (Obra Social) and dividends paid to equity units and preference shares. 
In France and United Kingdom stakeholder financial entities are governed by the basic princi-
ples of the cooperative banking model. In the case of United Kingdom, the structure is much 
more restrictive. Building societies are mutual organizations in which the governance bodies 
follow the principle of “one member, one vote”, which does not take into account how much 
money each person has invested or borrowed or how many accounts she has. They were 
created to foster the access to some financial services; in particular, their basic purpose is to 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 33 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 20
make loans secured on residential property and which are funded by its members.7 In fact, 
mortgage loans must represent at least 75 % of total assets. Capital is mostly raised through 
retained earnings (which represent around 85 % of total core Tier 1 capital)8 and, since 1981, 
they are able to issue deferred shares in the market in the form of Permanent Interest Bearing 
Shares (PIBS). PIBS carry a fixed non-cumulative coupon and they have no fixed maturity 
date, although they can be redeemed at the issuer’s discretion, which is the main reason why 
they count as non-core Tier 1 capital. UK building societies have principally (although not ex-
clusively) targeted capital issuance at wholesale investors rather than members. PIBS have 
voting rights, although the representation of these investors is reduced compared with that of 
members, since buildings societies are prohibited from raising more that 50 % of their funds 
from non-member deposits. As a way to compensate this, retail deposits are subordinated to 
wholesale funding in case of liquidation (although the first £50,000 is guaranteed by the Finan-
cial Services Compensation Scheme). 
In France, cooperative banks are organized as local or regional independent banks belong to 
a federated structure with two or three layers Local or regional layers (Fédérations or Caisses 
Fédérales) have a majority ownership of the national body (Confédérations). Central Network 
institutions exercise a top-down authority as local or regional institutions have delegated a 
great variety of functions, including treasury and risk management, mutual support,9 invest-
ment activities, debt issuance, group representation and back office functions such as IT sup-
port [Ayadi et al. (2010)]. Local and regional institutions still have their autonomy in decision-
making and management, and provide banking services enhancing access to credit for 
households and small and medium enterprises. Cooperative banks cannot raise capital in the 
market and they have the legal obligation to allocate profits as reserves.10 Nevertheless, they 
can issue shares similar to preferred shares and customers may also be required to subscribe 
for additional shares to access a loan [Ori et al. (2004)]. These listed non-voting shares receive 
an annual dividend determined by the banks’ statutes and legal ceilings. The role of coopera-
tive banks has gained importance as a result of their expansion through mergers and acquisi-
tions (financed through accumulated reserves). These developments have allowed the in-
crease in the number of financial services offered through the involvement in wholesale 
banking, insurance asset management, etc. (activities which are carried through specialized 
subsidiaries).
As previously mentioned, the financial inclusion of some segments of the population is no 
longer the main argument supporting the existence stakeholder-based banks. Thus, alterna-
tive arguments have been proposed, such as those related to their idiosyncratic risk manage-
ment. 
Some authors11 argue that stakeholder-based banks mitigate better the risk on an inter-tem-
poral basis than commercial banks. These entities tend to accumulate less risk through the 
cycle than commercial banks given that they are more strategically oriented towards the long 
run. Managers of stakeholder-based banks tend to be more prudent given that they cannot 
rely on external capital to compensate the losses derived from business mistakes. In some 
respect, it could be argued that stakeholder-based banks complement the commercial banks 
3 Pros and cons of 
stakeholder-based banks 
activity
7. Building Societies Commission. Factsheet, 1999. 8. Building Society Capital and related issues: a discussion paper. 
H. M. Treasury. March 2010. 9. Under the French Monetary and Financial code, the central organs of the cooperative 
institutions are required to guarantee the liquidity and solvency of the entities within their networks [Ayadi et al. 
(2010)]. 10. For example, in the case of Banque Populaire, the group-wide minimum rate is set as 10 % of profits and 
members have no rights on these net assets. The reserves are treated exactly as equity in Crédit Agricole and Crédit 
Mutuel, i.e. distributable to members and stockholders in the event of a default [Ayadi et al. (2010)]. 11. See Ayadi et 
al. (2009). 
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risk managing approach and improve the overall financial stability of the system [Michie and 
Llewellyn (2010)].12 These authors argue that this contribution to financial stability arises since 
“the more diversified is a financial system in terms of size, ownership and structure of busi-
nesses, the better it is able to weather the strains produced by the normal business cycle,...” 
In this sense assuring financing to some sectors financially constrained during stress periods, 
Delgado et al. (2006) find that the gain in size among savings banks between 1996-2003 im-
plied a relative specialization in relational lending towards small and medium size, more 
opaque, firms, something that has not been observed on the commercial banks.
An additional argument supporting the existence of these entities is related with the alignment 
of the interests between investors in the institution. Conflicts of interest between holders of 
debt (that receive a fixed coupon and are more risk averse) and those of equity (that have a 
limited liability and encourage a risk taking behaviour) in commercial banks are not character-
istic of stakeholder-based banks. In cooperative banks, the owners are both the customers 
and the debt holders so that they share similar interests and are particularly concerned about 
the sustainability of the activity of the company. However, in the case of savings banks some 
problems related with ownership structure could emerge, since it includes a mixture of agents 
(local or regional public authorities, employees, depositors, non profitable foundations...) with 
potentially very different kind of interests. Under this framework, the local public authorities 
tend to exert a great influence over the management of the entity. As a result, managers´ incen-
tives could be related with the short term political cycle and less so with those of debt holders. 
Obviously, the relevance of these problems became more apparent during the last decades as 
savings banks progressively extended the range and complexity of their business. As an ex-
ample, during the last years, in some countries, savings banks accumulated higher levels of 
risks in sectors like real estate – linked to regional government funding – than commercial 
banks.
There are some additional drawbacks related to the existence of stakeholder-based banks. 
Both cooperatives and saving banks are less exposed to market discipline than commercial 
banks. Although this independence could have some positive effects – as it favours the inter-
temporal management of risk – it also creates significant drawbacks because the monitoring 
of managers’ performance is softer making them more prone to accumulate higher levels of 
inefficiencies. 
Another additional weakness is that under their ownership structure, it is difficult to see any 
hostile takeovers even within the sector. As a direct consequence, this sector usually remains 
very fragmented and represented by relatively small entities. Under this situation, it becomes 
more difficult the adaptation to a new environment of competition and to improve their econo-
mies of scale or scope through mergers in areas such as information system, control of risk or 
business diversification. Moreover, their reduced dimension could be an obstacle to diversify 
their funding sources (i.e. access to some wholesale markets requires a minimum issuance 
size). Some institutions try to circumvent some of these problems (for example, the access to 
markets) by creating associations of saving or cooperative banks, as it is the case of the 
Landesbank in Germany or the Cooperative holdings in France. 
Finally, another argument usually raised relies on the fact that economic viability of some stake-
holder-based banks was based on the explicit or implicit public support that they received. 
These guarantees could create important competitive distortions; indeed the European Com-
12. The UK Government has announced its intention to foster competition in the banking system through an increase in 
the diversity in financial services and the promotion of mutuals. 
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mission and banking representatives accorded in 2001 the gradual removal of this public sup-
port. Landesbanken and savings banks do not enjoy these guarantees since July 2005. How-
ever, as it is discussed later on, the ownership structure and the involvement of the local 
public sector create some implicit guarantees for these entities that could be as complicated 
to mitigate as those that enjoyed too-big-to-fail institutions. 
The aforementioned advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder-based banks suggest that 
there may exist differences related to their financial performance in comparison to commercial 
banks. This section reviews some indicators of this performance focusing on different financial 
ratios with regard to profitability, liquidity, solvency and asset quality. Table 3 includes informa-
tion about some financial highlights for stakeholder-based banks (savings bank/thrift/mutual) 
and commercial banks in 2007 and 2009. In particular, data is based on median values since 
the presence of extreme values in our sample may distort the view of the sector as a whole. 
These medians are calculated over the sample of shareholders or stakeholder-based banks 
available for each of the countries included in this study (France, Germany, Norway, Spain and 
United Kingdom). The interpretation of the results should be made with extreme caution and 
should take into account limitations arising from using medians. This information does not 
provide detailed information of the entities included, neither of the most successful ones nor of 
those that have worst evolved through the financial crisis.
Data comes from SNL Financial Banking (Europe), a new database that includes information 
for commercial, cooperative and savings banks, listed and unlisted, in Europe. The database 
offers data obtained directly from the public accounts of these entities and allows to distin-
guish between stakeholder-based banks and commercial banks.13 However, some additional 
adjustment has been made to classify as stakeholder-based banks those entities that are not 
controlled by shareholders. The main adjustment consists on including as stakeholder-based 
banks entities like the Landesbanken and the French cooperative banks and excluding pure 
public financing institutes (like Instituto de Crédito Oficial) or national institutions (like Dekabank 
or Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros). Obviously, a fair comparison between these 
models requires a longer time horizon and some control variables like their size or specializa-
tion, however the required data for this exercise is not yet available. The sample includes 52 
commercial banks and 78 stakeholder-based banks.14 Given the size of the sample it is not 
possible to perform a detailed analysis discriminating between savings and cooperative banks; 
instead the comparison is made between the median stakeholder-based bank and the median 
commercial bank. 
In terms of profitability, commercial banks displayed better ratios than stakeholder-based banks, 
although the deterioration has been more pronounced for them between 2007 and 2009. How-
ever, these figures are likely to be affected by the absence of the aforementioned control varia-
bles – specialization, size, etc –. The efficiency of stakeholder-based banks was slightly lower 
than commercial banks in 2007, although these figures have converged in 2009 given the im-
provement in terms of cost-to-income of the former and the deterioration of the latter.
Regarding to their liquidity positions, the weight of deposit funding in terms of total assets was 
larger for stakeholder-based banks in 2007. However, there is almost no difference when 
4 The evolution of 
stakeholder-based banks 
during the financial crisis
4.1 THE FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF 
STAKEHOLDER-BASED BANKS 
DURING THE CRISIS
13. Other studies rely on data obtained from alternative sources with a wider coverage of entities. However, these data-
bases do not classify banks based on their ownership and, usually, provide adjusted measures that sometimes differ from 
the public financial statements. 14. The sample includes 3 stakeholder banks and 7 commercial banks for France; 36 
and 16 for Germany; 14 and 9 for Spain; 16 and 1 for Norway; and 9 and 19 for United Kingdom. Nevertheless, data was 
not available for all of the variables considered in Table 3 so the number of entities in each group varies among the differ-
ent variables included in this table.
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comparing this type of funding in terms of loans instead, since the share of assets devoted to 
loans has been larger for stakeholder-based banks. Related to their loan composition, they are 
more exposed to the mortgage sector perhaps as a consequence of the link of savings banks 
with real estate and also due to the specialization of building societies. Moreover, it is worth to 
emphasize that during the financial crisis, although there has been an adjustment in real estate 
in some of the sample countries, stakeholder-based banks have not been able to reduce their 
exposure to it as commercial banks.
As previously mentioned, stakeholder-based banks cannot raise capital in the market, which 
may be an important restriction, especially in periods of crisis when their solvency may be af-
fected by the deterioration in asset quality. Following this argument it could be expected that 
their solvency may be larger compared to their commercial peers. Indeed this argument is 
confirmed in the data, the median stakeholder-based bank displayed a larger level of Tier 1 
capital ratio than commercial banks during these years. Both types of institutions could im-
prove their capital levels during the financial crisis, while there has been a convergence among 
them as a result of the faster improvement in the case of commercial banks.
There exists heterogeneity among the group of entities considered in Table 3 and not all of 
them may display the same characteristics as the median institution. As an example, Chart 1 
presents the histograms of the ratio of Tier 1 capital for stakeholder-based banks in 2007 and 
STAKEHOLDER-BASED BANKS COMMERCIAL BANKS
2007 2009 ∆ BPS 2007 2009 ∆ BPS
PROFITABILITY (%)
ROAA 0.36 0.19 –0.17 0.69 0.31 –0.37
ROAE 8.41 3.88 –4.53 15.95 7.84 –8.11
Net Interest Margin 1.55 1.54 –0.02 1.26 1.38 0.12
Cost to Income 60.67 59.04 –1.63 55.08 58.48 3.40
BALANCE SHEET RATIOS (%)
Deposits/Assets 56.06 60.95 4.88 45.42 47.25 1.83
Deposits/Loans (Retail) 72.60 79.10 6.50 73.12 79.40 6.28
Net Loans/Assets 58.35 59.74 1.39 50.42 54.82 4.40
Mortgage Loans/Net loans to customers 49.18 50.07 0.90 44.56 42.73 –1.84
Tier 1 Common Ratio 8.05 9.37 1.32 6.62 8.70 2.08
Tier 1 Ratio 8.68 10.59 1.91 7.45 10.10 2.65
ASSET QUALITY (%)
Impaired & Delinquent Loans/Loans 2.32 4.49 2.18 3.85 6.05 2.20
Impaired Loans/Tangible Equity & Reserves 9.85 32.37 22.52 12.30 34.61 22.31
Provisions/Average Amortized Loans 0.11 0.49 0.37 0.36 1.12 0.77
Credit Costs/Pre-impairment Operating Profit 20.43 39.67 19.23 17.92 49.59 31.67
TABLE 3FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS - MEDIANS
SOURCE: SNL Financial.
NOTES: includes data for France, Germany, Norway, Spain and United Kingdom. For each variable those entities for which data is available 
are included, thus the number of entities between each variable may vary. The group of stakeholder-based banks includes those entities 
that are not controlled by shareholders, including entities like the Landesbanken and the French cooperative banks and excluding pure 
public financing institutes (Instituto de Crédito Oficial) or national entities (Dekabank). ∆ bps: difference in basis points.
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2009, together with the commercial banks’ median value. The majority of these institutions 
held higher levels of capital than the median commercial bank at the beginning of the financial 
crisis. The graph also points out that there has been a reduction in the dispersion of solvency 
ratio among stakeholder-based entities. 
Given their strong local roots, which allow them to assess better the credit worthiness and risk 
of costumers at local level [Groeneveld and De Vries (2009)], and their retail oriented business 
model, stakeholder-based banks are expected to follow a conservative banking approach. 
Thus the asset quality of these institutions could be expected to be more solid as this behav-
iour is translated into stronger balance sheets and lower credit risk. The data suggests that this 
was true in 2007 in terms of the percentage of problem loans, although credit costs were 
slightly larger. The deterioration in asset quality over the financial crisis hit both types of institu-
tions leading to an increasing need for loan loss provisions and an important increase in cred-
it costs.15
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CHART 1TIER 1 CAPITAL HISTOGRAM FOR THE STAKE-HOLDER
BASED BANKS GROUP
SOURCE: SNL Financial.
NOTES: includes data for France, Germany, Norway, Spain and United Kingdom. The group of 
stakeholder-based banks includes those entities that are not controlled by shareholders, including 
entities like the Landesbanken and the French cooperative banks and excluding pure public 
financing institutes (like Instituto de Crédito Oficial or Dekabank). 
15. Differences in non performing loans could partially be explained by the composition of the assets and the relative 
importance of mortgage loans, which tend to have a lower delinquency rate. 
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An approach to appraise the behaviour of the most affected institutions by the financial 
crisis could be the revision of the public support received by them. Stakeholder-based 
banks could be expected to better deal with some features of the financial crisis, in par-
ticular, with those related with the unexpected write-downs and the necessity to obtain 
public capital injections. However, as it is highlighted in the previous section, their financial 
record has not been very different to commercial banks. Moreover, with the exception of 
the English building societies, stakeholder-based banks have received significative amounts 
of public capital injections (see Table 4),16 which, in general, have been instrumented 
through preferred shares (ordinary shares participation would require the transformation of 
their legal status). 
Most of the stakeholder-based banks that have received public funds are saving banks. The 
only exception is France, where at the heights of the crisis cooperative banks required public 
capital support that has been already repaid to the Treasury. The origin of the losses incurred 
by these institutions varies among countries: In some cases stem from their national markets, 
as some German and Spanish saving banks, while in others came from their foreign positions 
(some Landesbanken in Germany). 
However banks did not only receive explicit public support, but they also benefited from the 
implicit guarantees of the government. This factor is important since financial markets con-
sider that some banking entities enjoy this implicit guaranty based on resolution difficulties. 
These difficulties could be related with the size or complexity of the banks (too big or too 
complex to fail) or with the ownership structure and the difficulty to remove some political 
counsellors from the board. Moreover, these guarantees are specially relevant to assess the 
viability of these institutions since, conversely to explicit guarantees, they use to have a perma-
nent nature. In this sense, this measure could give an idea of the economic impact that a new 
resolution framework with no public support or that, for example, imposes the share of losses 
by even senior debt holders.17
4.2 THE PUBLIC SUPPORT OF 
STAKEHOLDER-BASED BANKS 
DURING THE CRISIS
16. The financial crisis also revealed the importance to reassess the liquidity risk in some markets. This kind of risk has 
been misperceived by most of the analyst, regulators and managers and stakeholders managers were not an exception. 
Therefore they participate - like commercial banks- in all the emergency liquidity measures introduced in the aftermath of 
the crisis. 17. A clear example was that after the approval of a new resolution regime framework in Germany Moody’s 
decided to downgrade subordinated banking debt ratings for a number institutions (among them several sparkassen and 
landesbank). See Moody’s rating action of 17 February 2011. In March 2011 this agency also downgraded senior debt 
of several small and medium size spanish financial institutions based on the perception of a reduction of the public sup-
port [see Moody’s (2011)].
AMOUNT % ALL ENTITIES (c) NUMBER OF ENTITIES
Germany (b) 21.65 37 6
France 22.80 49 3
Spain 16.13 100 33
Norway 4.10 100 28
United Kingdom 1.60 2.4 1
TABLE 4PUBLIC CAPITAL INJECTION IN STAKEHOLDER-BASED BANKS FROM 2007 (a)
SOURCES: National authorities press releases.
a. Final Injected Amount. National Currency.
b. Includes the capital injection from the Lander Government.
c. Public capital injection received by stakeholder-based banks as a percentage of the total 
public capital injection to the banking sector.
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In order to approximate the importance of this guaranty one can compute a rating-based 
measure. Obviously this will be an incomplete indicator since ratings are only an indirect meas-
ure of cost of finance and rating agencies do not rate all the stake holder based banks. The 
steps taken to obtain this measure are:
1 The traditional “issuer ratings” – which take into account the likelihood of Govern-
ment or group support in case a bank is in stress – are compared with the “stan-
dalone rating” – which reflects a bank’s intrinsic strength [see Moody’s (2007)] –. 
The difference in terms of notches between the two ratings provides a qualitative 
measure of the subsidy because ratings have an impact on bank funding costs. 
2 Map ratings into bank bond yields by assigning the yearly average funding cost 
corresponding to long term and standalone rating using indices for the banking 
sector from Reuters. Then, the difference between these funding costs is multi-
plied by rating-sensitive liabilities of each bank.18 This exercise provides a quanti-
tative assessment of the subsidy for each bank.19 
Chart 2 compares the difference btween the two ratings for commercial banks as opposed to 
stakeholder-based banks (Step 1). In this case the sample is more reduced than in the previ-
ous section by focusing only on those institutions similar to commercial banks. In this case, 
some specialist stakeholder-based banks in Germany have been excluded since some of 
them are related with very specific sectors – like pharmaceutical or automobile. The data pro-
vides several interesting insights. First, at present in all countries both categories of banks 
enjoy a substantial implicit support (2 to 5 notches on average). Second, in some countries, 
such as UK and Spain, there was little or no implicit support before the crisis, whereas in Ger-
many and France there was already a large support, especially for stakeholder-based banks. 
Finally, a comparison across bank categories suggests that in Spain, UK and Norway com-
mercial banks currently enjoy roughly the same implicit support as stakeholder-based banks, 
whereas in Germany and France these institutions seem to have a higher support than com-
mercial banks (around 2 notches above). Moreover it should be noticed that during 2011 rat-
ings agencies reconsidered the willingness of governments to provide this kind of support to 
small and medium entities in case of failure. This revision has produced a significant decline of 
the importance of this factor and the subsequent rating downgrading for most of the spanish 
entities (see the dotted line).
Chart 3 shows the total amount (€bn) of the implicit subsidy for each country in 2007 and 2010 
(Step 2). At the beginning of the financial crisis the public support was reduced for most coun-
tries, although it was remarkable for commercial banks in United Kingdom (4.1 €bn) and 
stakeholder-based banks in Germany (6.0 €bn). It should be noted that the ratings computed 
by Moody’s take into account the support received within the group, that is, some of the im-
plicit subsidy displayed is related to the effect of the group’s support. The implicit subsidies 
increased over the next two years in all countries in an asymmetric way . In 2010 Germany, 
Spain and France presented a greater public support for stakeholder-based banks while in the 
case of United Kingdom the implicit subsidy is more important for large commercial banks.
The process of innovation and liberalization in the financial sector over the last decades has 
changed substantially the competitive environment of the financial industry, posing important 
5 Main challenges in the 
aftermath of the financial 
crisis: Back to the future 
or learning from past 
experiences?
18. Rating-sensitive liabilities are defined as deposits from banks and other financials, financial liabilities designated at fair 
value, debt securities in issue (excluding securitizations and covered bonds) and subordinated liabilities. 19. See Hal-
dane (2010).
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challenges for banking institutions, in general, and for stakeholder-based banks, in particular. On 
top of these structural changes, the financial crisis evidenced the importance of these challenges:
Corporate governance: The financial crisis highlighted the difficulty to manage institutions 
whose owners have a mixture of different targets as in the case of saving banks. This difficulty 
becomes especially problematic if short term objectives conflict with achieving long term eco-
nomic viability. As mentioned in Section 2, these problems became more apparent as savings 
banks progressively extended the range and complexity of their business model. In this con-
text it is important that corporate governance assures the long term viability of the entity.
Capital: Stakeholder-based banks only rely on retained profits to increase their capital level. 
This creates important difficulties in order to achieve the new requirements of Basel III, espe-
cially under an adverse economic environment to generate profits. To address this issue, sev-
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CHART 2IMPLICIT PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS - RATINGS 
NOTCHES DIFFERENCES (a)
SOURCES: Moody’s, and own calculations.
a. The average has been calculated for the financial entities rated by Moody’s. The dotted line in 
the case of Spain shows the difference in rating resulting from the review of the ratings of the 
senior debt of these institutions made by Moody’s in March 2011 [Moody’s (2011)].
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eral options could be considered, such as: Easing the injection of temporary public funds in 
order to achieve the new requirements, or lengthening the transition process towards the new 
regulatory framework. Furthermore, the reliance on retained earnings create also a structural 
problem since it is difficult for these entities to reinforce their solvency levels under a stress 
scenario. Some proposals try to overcome this burden through the introduction of new equity 
instruments, like contingent capital. However, in order to access to a suitable investor de-
mand, their marketability is a crucial factor, which may be hampered under by the mutual 
principle of “one member, one vote”. In this context, a greater participation in the management 
from new equity-shareholders could be considered as a way to make this instruments more 
attractive for external investors (as it is the case of the Equity Certificates in Norway or the 
modifications considered for the Permanent Interest Bearing Shares in UK).20
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CHART 3ESTIMATED SIZE OF THE IMPLICIT PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS (€bn)
SOURCES: Bankscope, Dealogic, SNL Financial, Moody’s, Reuters, and own calculations.
NOTE: The dotted line in the case of Spain shows the implicit public support taking into account 
the review of the ratings of the senior debt of these institutions made by Moody’s in March 2011.
20. In the case of United Kingdom [see H. M. Treasury (2010)] there are some proposals for new capital instruments in order 
to allow the access of building societies to alternative ways such as Contingent Convertible Notes or Rabobank Contingent 
Notes. In any case, it is recognized that, in order to access to a suitable base of investors, they should consider allowing in-
stitutional shareholders to represent their views directly to the societies’ management whilst ensuring mutual values.
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Funding: The new environment highlights two new tendencies in the funding of the banking 
sector: The weight of securitization and complex structured financial products is being re-
duced and there is an increased attention to the composition of funding with respect to assets 
(liquidity and funding ratios). Under this framework, stakeholder-based banks should maintain 
their traditional funding sources based on retail deposits but, taking into account the increased 
competition, they should also search for alternative forms of funding. One of the challenges for 
small and medium financial entities is the access to new funding sources such as covered 
bonds or the issuance of senior debt (for example, through a pooled funding model)21, al-
though this can imply the need to increase the weight of debt holders in their management.
Activity: There is a growing need to adapt these entities to an increased competitive frame-
work. This could imply that some entities need to expand their activity, which is usually con-
centrated in areas like mortgages or loans to the real estate sector. In order to do this it is 
important the aforementioned reform of the corporate governance in order to avoid political 
influences and foster the profesionalization of its board of managers. Moreover it could also be 
relevant to avoid some restrictions such as the territoriality principle in the case of Germany. 
Nevertheless, in the case of cooperative banks, it is not clear that the expansion of their busi-
ness model is a viable alternative for their adaptation to the new environment. Given that their 
existence is conditioned on the viability of some activity, the fact that it becomes unprofitable 
may imply a disappearance of the reason why they were created. That is, if it is not viable to 
maintain some cooperative banks that give loans to some sector it could be because their 
members are able to obtain cheaper funding through alternative sources.
Some of these challenges have already been addressed by some countries in the past. In 
particular, there are different approaches that have resulted in a different development of the 
stakeholder-based sector among countries and configured some of the differences comment-
ed in Section 2:
a) Orderly privatization process: Italy applied a gradual privatization process of the 
savings banks sector, mainly as a consequence of the several negotiations and 
different legislations that took place. The process started with the legal separation 
of the activities through the “Amato” law. The banking business was transferred 
into new joint-stock banking companies and the original savings banks were con-
verted into foundations that assumed all the socially oriented activities. The “Am-
ato” law required that these foundations should keep the ownership control of the 
joint-stock savings. Thereafter, through a series of implementation decrees, the 
authorities incentivized them to divest progressively their participation in the cap-
ital through fiscal advantages and, in 1998, the “Ciampi” law required foundations 
to relinquish control of the banks. The new joint-stock savings banks are financial 
entities governed by the civil code and the banking code, operating on an equal 
footing with all other banks. 
 Some studies have described this reform as a success as a result of the in-
creased profitability and competition of the banking sector [Carletti, Hakenes and 
Schnabel (2005)]. The privatization produced an important effect on the consoli-
dation of the sector. Some studies show [Campa and Hernando (2006)] that fi-
21. The UK Treasury reviewed some alternatives in order to adapt building societies to the new financial climate. In par-
ticular, it explores the idea of pooled funding models by which participating societies could gain access to new sources 
of wholesale funding by, for example, issuing covered bonds through an issuing entity owned jointly by a number of so-
cieties.
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nancial mergers usually improve the efficiency and productivity; in the Italian case 
[Fiorentino et al. (2009)] the gains in productivity were reinforced by the effects 
from the privatization and the removal of political interest in the management of 
the entities. 
b) Re-dimensioning stakeholder-based banks sector through a rapid liberalization 
and consolidation: The case of United Kingdom offers an example of a fast re-
dimensioning of stakeholder-based banks sector that is still relevant in its banking 
sector. During the 1980s four savings banks grouped their operating activities 
around a holding company, the Trustee Savings Bank Group (TSB Group). The 
initial public offering in 1986 of the TSB Group implied the privatization of the sav-
ings banks and the conversion into a public limited company. The cash obtained 
from the IPO allowed the group to acquire one of the biggest UK investment 
banks, Lloyds. The socially oriented activities were transferred into new created 
foundations (Lloyds TSB Foundation) which owned a part of the capital of the 
group, through which they were able to finance these activities. At the end, the 
restructuring of savings banks implied their complete disappearance from the 
banking sector. 
 It was precisely the same year of the privatization of the savings banks, 1986, 
when the restructuring of the building societies sector begun with the allowance 
to convert themselves into public limited companies. As a result, during the 1990s 
a demutualization and consolidation process took place with eleven building so-
cieties becoming private banks (including the largest one, Halifax). On the con-
trary to the Italian case, the conversion of savings banks was voluntary, requiring 
two-thirds of existing members to vote in favor of it. By 2008 no one of the con-
verted building societies maintained their independent status either because 
commercial banks acquire them (e.g. Abbey National or Alliance and Leicester) or 
because they were forced into public ownership (Northern Rock and Bradford & 
Bingley). It seems that one of the potential gains of the privatization process that 
was suggested – easier access to capital markets [Cook, Deakin and Hughes 
(2001)] – turned out to be one of the main problems that affected these entities 
as a result of the lack of management experience of wholesale funding and ex-
panded financial activities. On the contrary, the performance of building societies 
during the last financial crisis has been comparatively better which has motivated 
a new debate towards the protection of this sector. Moreover, some authors have 
proposed the remutualization of failed financial institutions like Northern Rock 
[Michie and Llewellyn (2010)]. 
c) Private ownership inclusion and the maintenance of the stakeholder-based banks 
model: In Norway the reform of 1987 provided savings banks with the possibility 
to raise external capital issuing primary capital certificates (PCCs) that give some 
ownership over the capital. In 2009, in order to improve the marketability of 
PCCs, the influence of external investors increased with the introduction of Eq-
uity Certificates. This reform brings this capital instrument closer to ordinary 
shares, with the exception that their influence is limited to a 40 % of the General 
Assembly and the existence of the compensation fund that reduces their risk in 
case of a winding up. At the end, the reforms have maintained the nature and 
legal status of these companies while, to some extent, addressed the challenges 
related to the corporate governance problems and the difficulties that these insti-
tutions face raising equity in the market. 
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d) Towards a more aggregated cooperative bank model: In some countries the 
stakeholder-based banks sector has evolved towards an aggregation of these 
entities through central bodies that maintain the independence of the entities. 
These central bodies are able to maintain a diverse funding and create important 
economies of scale. In this case, stakeholder-based banks still keep their social 
vocation but their management maintains a high level of independence with re-
spect to stakeholders. This is the case of Rabobank in Netherlands (the only 
European financial institution that maintains the AAA rating) and cooperative 
banks in France. 
These experiences give a sense of the different approaches that could be adopted in order to 
reform the stakeholder-based banks sector. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the different 
country conditions imply that the effects of the reforms could differ significantly among them. 
The selection of each model, which is neither the purpose of this paper nor possible before 
having evidence about the performance of these entities after the regulatory reform, depends 
to a great extent on the political willingness to maintain or privatize the sector. In economic 
terms, it is not easy to find which model has better properties. In fact, in order to do this one 
would need to see the performance of the sector over several decades and study which ad-
vantages or disadvantages it presents with respect to prior models.
AYADI, R., D. T. LLEWELLYN, R. H. SCMIDT, E. ARBAK and W. PIETER (2010). Investigating Diversity in the Banking 
Sector in Europe: Key Developments, Performance and Role of Cooperative Banks, Centre for European Policy 
Studies.
AYADI, R., R. H. SCMIDT, S. CARBÓ, E. ARBAK and F. RODRÍGUEZ (2009). Investigating Diversity in the Banking Sector 
in Europe: The Performance and Role of Savings Banks, Centre for European Policy Studies.
BANK OF SPAIN (2010). Financial Stability Report, October.
CAMPA, J. M., and I. HERNANDO (2006). “M&As performance in the European financial industry”, Journal of Banking and 
Finance, vol. 30, no. 12, 
CARBÓ, S., D. B. HUMPHREY and F. RODRÍGUEZ (2002). “Bank deregulation is better than mergers”, Journal of Inter-
national Financial Markets, Institutions & Money.
CARBÓ, S., and J. M. MÉNDEZ (2006). “La relevancia de la diversidad de estructuras de propiedad en el sector bancario 
europeo”, Perspectivas del Sistema Financiero, no. 88, pp. 87-105.
CARLETTI, E., H. HAKENES and I. SCHNABEL (2005). “The privatization of Italian savings banks – A role model for 
Germany?”, DIW Quarterly Journal of Economic Research.
CENTRO PWC/IE DEL SECTOR FINANCIERO (2010). Un nuevo modelo para las cajas de ahorros.
COOK, J., S. DEAKIN and A. HUGHES (2002). “Mutuality and Corporate Governance: The Evolution of Building Societies 
Following Deregulation”, Journal of Corporate Law, 2, pp. 110-138.
DELGADO, J., V. SALAS and J. SAURINA (2006). “Joint size and ownership specialization in bank lending”, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 31, pp. 3563-3583.
FIORENTINO, E., A. DE VINCENZO, F. HEID, A. KARMANN and M. KOETTER (2009). The effects of privatization and 
consolidation on bank productivity:comparative evidence from Italy and Germany, Temi di discussione (Working 
Paper) no. 722, Banca d’Italia.
GROENEVELD, J. M., and B. DE VRIES (2009). European co-operative banks: first lessons from the subprime crisis, 
Working Paper, Rabobank.
HALDANE, A. (2010). “The 100 billion question”, speech at the Institute of Regulation & Risk, Hong Kong, 30 March.
H. M. TREASURY (2010). “Building Society Capital and related issues: a discussion paper”, March.
— (2009). “Reforming Financial Markets”, July.
JAPPELLI, T., and M. PAGANO (1993). “Information sharing in credit markets”, The Journal of Finance, vol. 48, no. 5, 
December, pp. 1693-718.
— (2001). “Information sharing, lending and defaults:cross-country evidence”, Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 26, 
no. 10, October, pp. 2023-2054.
MICHIE, J., and LLEWELLYN (2010). “Converting failed financial institutions into mutual organizations”, Journal of Social 
Entrepreneurship.
MOODY’S (2007). Bank Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology.
— (2011). “Moody’s Reassesses Systemic Support for Senior Debt of Smaller European Financial Institutions: Spanish 
Bank Ratings Downgraded as a First Step”, Special Comment, 24 March.
OLIVER WYMAN (2008). Co-operative Banks: Customer Champion.
ORI, J., M. JAEGER and E. GURTNER (2004). “Cooperative status in the banking sector, efficiency and growth strategy. 
The French situation”, EFMA newsletter no. 187. 
PÉREZ FERNÁNDEZ, J., L. RODRÍGUEZ JIMÉNEZ and A. JIMÉNEZ FERNÁNDEZ (2007). “Las Cajas de Ahorros. Modelo 
de negocio, estructura de propiedad y gobierno corporativo”, Papeles de la Fundación, no. 218.
WSBI and ESBG (2011). Corporate governance and access to finance.
REFERENCES
